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BACK TO BASICS: 
WHY FINANCIAL REGULATORY OVERHAUL IS 
OVERRATED 
 
RENEE M. JONES∗ 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Our current economic and financial crisis has predictably led to 
calls for an overhaul of our financial regulatory structure.  The dominant 
reform proposals are premised on the notion that our system of financial 
regulation has failed to keep up with the realities and complexities of 
modern financial markets.  Reform proponents thus urge sweeping changes 
that would eliminate many of our principal regulatory institutions and 
replace them with a few bigger and better agencies.  There are several 
variations on this theme, but the dominant proposals envision consolidating 
multiple agencies that currently oversee banks, insurers, and brokerage 
firms into one or two national regulatory bodies. 
 In this essay, I suggest that regulatory overhaul is the wrong 
prescription for our times.  We should instead pursue a “Back to Basics” 
approach to regulatory reform.  A Back to Basics strategy is founded on the 
notion that the regulatory system erected as part of the New Deal, while 
imperfect, worked for more than seventy years to forestall the kind of 
catastrophic collapse we are currently experiencing.  On this analysis, the 
current crisis cannot be properly attributed to a failure to modernize 
financial regulation.  It is instead more appropriate to view the current 
collapse as the end result of a systematic effort to dismantle the regulatory 
structure created during the New Deal. 
 Over the past thirty years Congress and the courts have chipped 
away at the foundation of the financial regulatory apparatus that was 
constructed in the aftermath of the 1929 market crash.1  Under the guise of 
clever and cheerful labels such as “Improvement,” “Modernization,” and 
“Reform,” the New Deal structure has been effectively dismantled.  While 
most of the New Deal legislation and institutions remain in place, their 
                                                          
∗ Associate Professor, Boston College Law School.  This essay benefited from 
comments from participants in the Conference on The Credit Crash of 2008: 
Regulation Within Economic Crisis at The Ohio State University Moritz College of 
Law in March 2008, and at a faculty workshop at Boston College Law School.  The 
author is indebted to Boston College Law School and David Perini for research 
support.  Arianna Tunsky and Michael Kaupa provided invaluable research 
assistance.   
1 See generally JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 
(Northeastern University Press 1995). 
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effectiveness has been undermined by a host of legal developments, leaving 
an illusion of financial regulation that masked the reality that the regime 
had been so weakened that it was no longer capable of managing mounting 
conflicts of interests or controlling systemic risk.  By itself each chip at the 
mortar of our regulatory system seemed unremarkable.  Collectively, their 
impact has been far worse than even the greatest skeptics of deregulation 
might have imagined. 
 Perhaps the most significant deregulatory reform of the era was the 
erosion and eventual repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, 2 the 1930s legislation 
that mandated separation between investment banking and commercial 
banking.  Through persistent lobbying efforts by commercial banks, the 
Glass-Steagall wall was weakened and finally repealed when Congress 
passed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999.3  To restore economic 
stability and financial soundness we should reinstate the separation between 
commercial banking and more risky enterprises and return to a financial 
industry populated by more, smaller banks.4   
                                                          
2 Glass-Steagall is more formally known as the Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 
73-66, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 
U.S.C.).  Sections 16 and 20 of Glass-Steagall prohibited banks from underwriting 
or dealing in corporate securities, and from affiliating with firms engaged in such 
activities.  Glass-Steagall Sections 16 and 20, codified at 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1994 & 
Supp. II 1997); 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1994).  Section 21 prohibited securities firms 
from offering banking services.  See generally RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., 
THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 16-29 (Aspen Publishers 4th 
ed. 2009); THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 12-13 (6th 
ed. 2009). 
3 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 
113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12, 15, 16 & 18 U.S.C.A.). 
4 A number of commentators have taken note of the problems that ensued after 
Glass-Steagall’s repeal, yet so far few legislative proposals have emerged to 
reinstate the divide and the prospects for these initiatives are dim.  As of this 
writing two bills have been introduced in the Senate to restore some of the 
restrictions formerly imposed by Glass-Steagall.  Senator Bernard Sanders has 
sponsored a bill that would require the Treasury Secretary to break up any financial 
institution deemed too big to fail.  Big Bank "Break-Up" Idea Gains Ground in 
Congress, REUTERS.COM, Nov. 6 2009, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN0618960720091106.  Senators John McCain 
and Maria Cantwell have also proposed legislation to restore many of Glass-
Steagall’s restrictions.  Michael Hirsh, An Odd Post-Crash Couple, Spurning 
Obama, McCain and Cantwell Propose Resurrecting Glass-Steagall to Break Up 
Wall Street, NEWSWEEK.COM, Dec. 15 2009, 
http://www.newsweek.com/id/226938/.  For commentators who have lamented the 
demise of Glass-Steagall and the rise of big banks see Joseph E. Stiglitz, Capitalist 
Fools, VANITY FAIR, Jan. 2009, at 50 (“The most important consequence of the 
repeal of Glass-Steagall was indirect – it lay in the way repeal changed an entire 
culture.  Commercial banks are not supposed to be high-risk ventures; they are 
supposed to manage other people’s money very conservatively.”); see generally 
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This essay takes issue with the dominant diagnosis that our economic 
problems are due to outmoded regulations that could not keep up with the 
realities of modern markets.  It posits, instead, that the financial crisis was a 
foreseeable result of sustained efforts to erode the regulatory protections 
that emerged during the New Deal.  This slow and steady erosion of 
regulatory controls allowed conflicts of interests to swell and let pockets of 
unregulated economic activity expand unchecked until they overwhelmed 
the regulated sectors of our financial markets.  To restore confidence in our 
financial institutions regulatory reformers should look backward before 
looking forward.  We need to understand better how the system failed 
before we can determine how best to fix it.   
A Back to Basics strategy does not require the implementation of new 
rules or the creation of new agencies.  Instead the approach contemplates an 
increase in enforcement efforts and the strengthening of existing agencies to 
equip them to better perform the duties that Congress assigned to them.  
The strategy is preferable to proposals to overhaul the regulatory system 
because it addresses weaknesses in the regulatory structure with tools that 
have already been proven effective.  A Back to Basics strategy does not 
preclude further regulatory reforms that would streamline and consolidate 
regulatory agencies.  However, in a time of crisis, a reform strategy that is 
clear and easy to implement offers many advantages over efforts to create a 
new regulatory system out of whole cloth.   
 Although getting Back to Basics would require a number of 
adjustments to current policies, this essay will focus on a reform idea that 
has been under-explored in policy discussions: restoring Glass-Steagall’s 
traditional division between commercial banking and investment banking.  
This reform would address many of the concerns voiced by advocates of 
regulatory consolidation and would also create firebreaks that could 
dampen the impact of futures scandal or economic downturns that occur in 
one sector of the financial industry or the other. 
 Reintroducing the division between investment banks and 
commercial banks would allow bank regulators to focus on their area of 
expertise (deposit insurance and capital adequacy) while securities and 
market regulators focus on investor protection and curbing abuses in the 
capital markets.  Consolidation by itself does not guarantee improved 
regulation and would likely increase risks of regulatory failure.  Regulatory 
overlap and redundancy, while seemingly inefficient, actually provide 
important protections because regulatory agencies can backstop one 
                                                                                                                                      
BYRON DORGAN, RECKLESS!: HOW DEBT, DEREGULATION, AND DARK MONEY 
NEARLY BANKRUPTED AMERICA (AND HOW WE CAN FIX IT!) (Thomas Dunne 
Books 2009); Eliot Spitzer, Too Big Not to Fail: We Need to Stop Using the 
Bailouts to Rebuild Gigantic Financial Institutions, SLATE, Dec. 8, 2008, 
http://www.slate.com/id/2205995/. 
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another, making it less likely that misconduct and abuse will fall through 
cracks in the regulatory mortar. 5 
 The recent bailouts of failing financial institutions have been 
justified by the assertion that these institutions are “too big to fail.”  Their 
“too big to fail” status means that corporate officials and shareholders need 
not take full responsibility for their mistakes, as the government must step 
in to save these failing institutions in order to forestall further economic 
catastrophe.  A direct response to the too big to fail phenomenon and the 
moral hazard it creates is to prohibit the bailed-out banks from remaining 
too big to fail.  Unfortunately, financial regulators have pursued the 
opposite course by encouraging mergers between investment banks and 
commercial banks that only serve to exacerbate the too big to fail 
dilemma.6   
A wiser course would be for the government, first, to act to 
stabilize our banks to ensure their financial soundness.  The next step 
should be a process for the orderly divestiture of investment banking assets 
by the major banks and vice versa.  This reform seems to be a crucial step 
for counteracting both the too big to fail and too big to regulate phenomena 
that spurred the financial crisis and the unavoidable subsequent government 
bailout.7 
 
II.  THE DOMINANT MODELS FOR FINANCIAL REFORM 
 
A common diagnosis for our current ills is that financial regulators 
were too fragmented, inadequately informed, and lacked sufficient authority 
to effectively oversee the activities of large conglomerate banks.  The rapid 
growth in unregulated market sectors such as hedge funds and derivatives 
trading also deprived regulators of the information necessary to monitor and 
                                                          
5 See Renee M. Jones, Dynamic Federalism: Competition, Cooperation and 
Securities Enforcement, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 121-26 (2004-2005). 
6 Federal regulators cajoled J.P. Morgan Chase to take over the failing Bear Stearns 
investment bank last spring.  See David Cho & Neil Irwin, Crisis of Confidence in 
the Market: Federal Reserve’s Rescue of Bear Stearns Exposes Cracks in 
Financial System, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2008, at A1; Robin Sidel et al., J.P. 
Morgan Buys Bear in Fire Sale, as Fed Widens Credit to Avert Crisis, WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 17, 2008, at A1; Andrew Ross Sorkin, In Sweeping Move, Fed Backs Buyout 
and Wall St. Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2008, at A1.  Under similar pressure, the 
troubled brokerage giant Merrill Lynch merged with Bank of America in the fall of 
2008. See Louise Story, Stunning Fall for Main Street’s Brokerage Firm, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008, at A1; Carrick Mollenkamp et al., Crisis on Wall Street as 
Lehman Totters, Merrill is Sold, AIG Seeks to Raise Cash –Fed Will Expand its 
Lending Arsenal in a Bid to Calm Markets, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2008, at A1. 
7 See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services 
Industry, 1975-2000:  Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 215, 305 (2002) (arguing that the largest universal banks have become 
too big to monitor effectively). 
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control systemic risk.  Some reform advocates reason that financial 
regulators need broader authority over financial institutions that pose 
systemic risk to the financial markets in order to prevent a recurrence of the 
recent market collapse.   
 From these observations flow prescriptions for combining our 
fragmented bank, insurance, and securities markets regulators into mega-
institutions that can gather and digest information on all these financial 
products and activities.  Although this prescription has a certain logical 
appeal, it overlooks other deeper causes of our problems.  Because it fails to 
take into account these other crucial concerns, regulatory consolidation is 
unlikely to achieve the positive results its proponents promise. 
 The dominant proposals for financial regulatory reform cluster 
around two competing models for financial regulatory consolidation – the 
so-called “Twin Peaks” model and calls for a universal regulator.  Under 
Twin Peaks, financial regulation would be divided between two principal 
objectives: Prudential Regulation and Conduct Regulation/Consumer 
Protection – each under the aegis of a separate regulatory agency.  By 
contrast, a universal regulator would exercise nearly exclusive authority 
over all financial institutions throughout the country.8   
 These consolidation proposals are premised on the need to correct 
for weaknesses in our current regulatory regime in a post-Glass-Steagall 
environment.9  After the barriers that historically separated the financial 
institutions along functional lines were dismantled, regulators faced a 
number of challenges in seeking to oversee the disparate business units that 
comprised the universal banks. F10    
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8 See, e.g., Howell E. Jackson, A Pragmatic Approach to the Phased Consolidation 
of Financial Regulation in the United States (Harvard Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal 
Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 09-19, 2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1300431; Elizabeth F. Brown, E Pluribus Unum – Out of 
Many, One: Why the United States Needs a Single Financial Services Agency, 14 
U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1 (2005). 
9 Jackson, supra note 8, at 3 (“[O]ur financial regulatory structure is in profound 
need of reorganization.”). 
10 U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, The Department of the Treasury Blueprint for a 
Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure (Mar. 2008) [hereinafter the Blueprint] 
(on file with the Ohio State Entrepreneurial Business Law Journal) (the current 
“approach to regulation exhibits several inadequacies, the most significant being 
the fact that no single regulator possesses all of the information and authority 
necessary to monitor systemic risk . . . ,”). 
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A.  The Twin Peaks Model 
 
One of the more fashionable proposals for regulatory consolidation 
is the Twin Peaks model for financial oversight. F11  The Twin Peaks model 
has been adopted in Australia and the Netherlands.  It provides the 
structural foundation for the Treasury Department’s Blueprint and the G-30 
proposals discussed below.   
Under Twin Peaks, two principal regulatory agencies would 
oversee the financial markets.  A Prudential Regulator would focus on 
ensuring the safety and soundness of major financial institutions, a function 
now performed by the Federal Reserve and other bank regulators.  The 
second peak in Twin Peaks is a Business Conduct Regulator that would 
oversee business conduct, consumer protection, and corporate disclosure.  
The objective of this model is to create regulatory agencies with broad-
enough authority to oversee all categories of financial institutions.  
Concomitant with such consolidation would be a move toward greater 
uniformity in oversight to be provided by increased federal regulatory 
authority over those financial institutions that opt in (via a federal charter) 
at the expense of state-based oversight. 
 
B.   The Universal Regulator 
 
 An alternative consolidation model is the proposal to create a single 
universal regulator with authority over all financial institutions throughout 
the country.  Calls for a universal regulator are prompted by the United 
Kingdom’s (“U.K.”) adoption of this framework.  In 1997, the U.K. created 
the Financial Services Authority (“FSA”) to oversee its financial markets.  
The FSA has authority over banks, investment banks, financial advisers, 
insurers, and broker-dealers.  Some commentators laud the U.K. model and 
urge United States policy makers to create a similar structure. F12   
The rationale for a universal regulator echoes the justification 
offered for Twin Peaks – because financial institutions are no longer 
separated along functional lines, the functional regulatory structure is 
obsolete. F13  Advocates also express concerns about complexity, 
redundancy, competence, and regulatory arbitrage to support the notion that 
                                                          
11 See, e.g., Michael Taylor, Twin Peaks: A Regulatory Structure for the New 
Century (Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation 1995); John C. Coffee, Jr. & 
Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury Have a Better Idea?, 95 
VA. L. REV. 7097 (2009). 
12 Jackson, supra note 8, at 3-4 (praising the U.K.’s single regulator model); 
Brown, supra note 8 at 7 
13 Brown, supra note 8, at 4-5. 
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bigger would be better when it comes to overseeing the financial markets. 14  
They note that regulatory fragmentation, lack of expertise in agencies, low 
prestige for regulatory jobs, and problems of both regulatory redundancy 
and regulatory gaps all plague our balkanized system for overseeing 
financial firms. 15  In contrast to the multiple agencies that now exist, a 
universal regulator would be well equipped to sort out the turf battles that 
plague the regulatory system and to act quickly to fill regulatory gaps when 
necessary. F16  Thus, despite the recent high-profile failures of some of 
Britain’s major banks, F17 these commentators recommend U.K’s FSA as a 
model for US reform.  
 
C.  Specific Reform Proposals 
 
1.  The Treasury “Blueprint” 
 
The starting point for most discussions of financial regulatory 
reform is the Treasury Department’s Blueprint published in the spring of 
2008 under Bush Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson. F18  The Blueprint 
combines recommendations for regulatory consolidation with proposals to 
eliminate or dilute key aspects of the regulatory structure.  Most 
significantly the Blueprint envisions significantly weakening the securities 
enforcement regime (both public and private).  It calls for shifting the 
Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”) enforcement functions to 
self-regulatory organizations (SRO’s) and eliminating states’ powers to 
enforce their securities laws. F19   
The Blueprint asserts that jurisdictional disputes among the myriad 
financial regulators hinder the introduction of new products, slow 
innovation, and force entities to pursue their activities in “more adaptive 
                                                          
14 Jackson, supra note 8, at 16-23 (consolidated oversight has numerous 
advantages); Brown, supra note 8, at 74-81. 
15 Jackson, supra note 8, at 15-17. 
16 Id. at 18-20 
17 See Julia Werdigier, For Lack of Other Investors, Royal Bank of Scotland Sells 
Control to Britain, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2008, at B3; Emma Charlton & Laurence 
Norman, U.K. Government Plans Northern Rock Revival, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 
2009, at C3;  Alistair MacDonald, U.K. Watchdog Adds More Bark, Bite: FSA’s 
Lax Approach Faulted in Bank Meltdown; Avoiding Next Northern Rock, WALL 
ST. J., Jan. 5, 2009, at C2.   
18 Blueprint, supra note 10. 
19 Id. at 20, 178-80; see also Coffee & Sale, supra note 11, at 767-73; Secretary of 
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Securities Division, States’ Demonstrated 
Record of Effectiveness In Their Investor Protection Efforts Underscores the Need 
to Avoid Further Preemption of State Enforcement Authority 10-11 (Dec. 2008) 
(discussing the Blueprint’s proposal and arguing for retaining state enforcement 
authority). 
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foreign markets.” 20  It therefore recommends an “objectives” based 
regulatory approach that is a variation on Twin Peaks.  The Blueprint 
identifies three key regulatory objectives:  (1) market stability; (2) safety 
and soundness; and (3) business conduct, and recommends the creation of a 
distinct regulatory agency charged with each objective. F21  The “Prudential 
Financial Regulatory Agency (“PFRA”) would monitor safety and 
soundness, F22 the Conduct of Business Regulatory Agency (“CBRA”) would 
handle licensing and consumer protection, 23 and the Fed would play the 
role of  market stability regulator, and would focus sharply on controlling 
systemic risk. 24   
The Blueprint also recommends merging the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission (“CFTC”) and the SEC and suggests that such 
consolidation should be preceded by the SEC’s adoption of the more porous 
principles-based model of regulation that the CFTC employs. F25  The 
Blueprint describes the CFTC’s principles-based approach as “more 
conducive to the modern marketplace.” F26  Such a move envisions the 
dilution of the SEC’s regulatory power vis-à-vis recommendations for 
regulatory forbearance with respect to new products and “global investment 
companies,” and the adoption of a self-certification regime for new SRO 
rulemaking, and a self-regulatory regime for financial advisers.  
  
2.  The G30 Framework 
 
In January 2009, the Group of Thirty (“G30”) released its Report 
on Financial Reform (“G30 Report”). 27 The G30 Report seems to have 
replaced the Blueprint as the starting point for President Obama’s reform 
proposals.    Like the Blueprint, the G30 Report focuses on the need for 
effective prudential regulation and recommends the designation of a 
                                                          
20 Blueprint, supra note 10, at 4. 
21 Blueprint, supra note 10, at 13-14. 
22 Id. at 14.  The PFRA would assume the role of the Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency and the Office of Thrift Supervision. 
23 Id.  The CBRA would address the business conduct of all financial institutions 
and would take on a consumer/investor protection role. 
24 Id. at 15. 
25 Id. at 11-13. 
26 Id. at 12. 
27 Group of 30, Financial Reform: A Framework for Financial Stability, January 
2009.  The Group of 30 (“G30”) Working Group on Financial Reform was chaired 
by Paul Volcker, one of President Obama’s economic advisers.  The G30 had 
already issued a report on the structure of financial regulation that seemed to 
endorse the Twin Peaks model. Press Release, Group of Thirty, Reforms of 
Banking Regulation Seen as Urgent – Approaches in Many Countries Fall Short in 
the Face of Today’s Market Strains, the Pace of Financial Innovation and 
Globalization (October 6, 2008) (available at 
http://www.group30.org/100608release.pdf). 
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prudential regulator with power to oversee all financial institutions with the 
potential for creating systemic risk, regardless of the type of financial 
product or services they provide. F28 Unlike the Blueprint, which favors self-
regulation or light regulation over robust government oversight, the G30 
Report envisions an expanded federal regulatory role. 
The G30 Report includes specific recommendations on policies a 
prudential regulator should adopt, including prohibiting banks from 
sponsoring hedge funds or engaging in large-scale proprietary trading, 
limiting deposit concentrations at banks, regulating hedge funds and private 
equity groups to monitor for systemic risk, and creating a structure for over-
the-counter derivatives trading. F29  The G30 Report also recommends more 
robust standards for risk management and governance for financial firms, 
although its recommendations on this point are vague. F30   
 
3.  The Obama Plan 
 
In June 2009, President Barack Obama released the details of his 
administration’s much-anticipated proposal for financial regulatory reform 
(the “Obama Plan”). F31  The Obama Plan appears to draw heavily on the 
G30 Report, but it deviates from the G30 Report’s recommendations in 
several respects.  Most notably, the plan disregards calls for regulatory 
consolidation and would instead create new federal agencies and offices 
charged with financial regulatory matters. 
The centerpiece of the Obama Plan is the proposal to vest the Fed 
with new powers to act as a systemic risk regulator.  In this role, the Fed 
would assume oversight not only over banks and their holding companies, 
but also over any financial institution deemed to be systemically significant.  
Systemically significant financial institutions would be designated “Tier 1” 
firms, and the Fed would have the power to impose restrictions on these 
firms regarding of capital adequacy, risk management and compensation 
practices that exceed those applicable to other financial institutions.  
By giving the Fed expanded powers for prudential regulation, the 
Obama Plan embraces Twin Peaks’ call for a systemic risk monitor; yet it 
departs from Twin Peaks because the Fed would not have a singular 
objective.  In addition to monitoring systemic risk, the Fed would continue 
to manage monetary policy, market stability and other important tasks.  
Furthermore, the Obama Plan leaves “business conduct” regulation under 
the purview of a wide-ranging alphabet soup of financial regulators.   
                                                          
28 G-30 Report, supra note 27, at 17.   
29 Id. at 28-29, 52-53. 
30 Id at 40-42. 
31 Department of the Treasury, A New Foundation: Rebuilding Financial 
Supervision and Regulation (June 2009),  available at 
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport_web.pdf. 
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The Obama Plan would eliminate only one financial agency – the 
Office of Thrift Supervision, and would create a new Consumer Financial 
Protection Agency to focus on consumer protection in credit cards, 
mortgages and other financial products.  It would also add a new National 
Insurance Office to monitor the insurance industry. 
The Obama Plan would also grant the Fed and the FDIC 
“resolution authority” over systemically significant financial firms, whether 
operating as a bank or otherwise.  This would give the federal government 
power to take receivership of failing or insolvent financial institutions 
whether banks, bank holding companies, insurance groups or otherwise.  
This would allow for the orderly unwinding of failing financial institutions  
without the risk of destabilizing the economy as the Lehman Brothers 
bankruptcy did.  
 The impact of the Obama Plan ultimately depends on how 
effectively the Fed (or other regulator) exercises its authority as a systemic 
risk monitor.  Many commentators and legislators have expressed 
misgivings about the Fed’s prospective role. F32  They point to the Fed’s 
failure to protect consumers from predatory lending practices which played 
a central role in fueling the subprime mortgage market, and its participation 
in the bailouts of Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch and AIG to underscore their 
doubts.  Equally ominous for the Obama Plan, several senior financial 
regulators have expressed concerns with the proposal.  FDIC Chair, Sheila 
Bair, and TARP Overseer, Elizabeth Warren have both stated a preference 
for granting the Financial Oversight Council, a broader group of regulators, 
to authority to monitor systemic risk. 33 
 
D.  Problems with Consolidation Proposals  
 
The dominant proposals for regulatory restructuring, including 
the Obama Plan, suffer from a common set of weaknesses. First, these 
reform models tend to eschew substance and instead pin their hopes on the 
belief that reshuffling regulatory authority by itself will improve the 
                                                          
32 See Edmund L. Andrews, Two Authorities on Fed Advise Congress Against 
Expanding its Power, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2009, at B3; Sudeep Reddy, The 
Financial Regulatory Plan: Not Everyone is Cheering Fed’s New Role, WALL ST. 
J., June 18, 2009, at A9 (quoting Senator Dodd and Representative Frank as 
lacking confidence in the Fed). 
33 David Cho, Binyamin Appelbaum & Zachary A. Goldfarb, Goals Shift for 
Reform of Financial Regulation; Anticipating Resistance; Obama Changes Track, 
WASH. POST, June 10, 2009, at A01 (quoting FDIC Chair Sheila Bair).  The 
financial reform bill approved by the House in December 2009 delegates authority 
over systemically significant firms to a financial services oversight council 
comprised of the heads of federal financial regulatory agencies.  See Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 
2009). 
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effectiveness of regulation.  It is more important, however, for 
policymakers to focus on the rules regulators would adopt and how they 
would enforce them, than what to call an agency or what sectors of the 
financial industry it would oversee.   
Second, most regulatory overhaul plans fail to build on the 
strengths of our existing regulatory system, despite its proven track record 
prior to the deregulatory era.  For most of its existence, the SEC has been 
one of the most effective federal agencies, yet many reform proposals 
would sweep away the SEC to make way for its newer, bigger, and better 
counterparts.  It is to President Obama’s credit that he has so far resisted 
calls to consolidate financial regulation and has instead adopted a more 
incremental approach to regulatory reform. 
Third, a significant degree of risk accompanies efforts to create 
new agencies and rules out of whole cloth. F34 There is logic inherent in the 
impact of path dependency on regulation.  By building on prior experience 
we can preserve institutional knowledge and expertise that can protect 
regulators from having to relearn hard lessons from the past.  An 
incremental approach to reform protects the expectations of regulated 
parties and as well as those whose interests the regulation is meant to serve.   
The unprecedented size and power of the newly proposed agencies 
also cautions restraint.  Consolidation could result in the creation of 
unwieldy agencies that are difficult to administer and control.  Risks of 
regulatory capture and regulatory missteps intensify with a consolidated 
regulator.  The elimination of alternative agencies with jurisdiction over 
financial institutions means the absence of a backstop when the principal 
regulator falls asleep at the switch. 35 
 Finally, coordination of the type envisioned by consolidation 
proposals may be more elusive than its proponents predict.  Our most recent 
experience with large-scale consolidation has not been an unqualified 
success.  The Department of Homeland Security has still not been able to 
bring the agencies it oversees into better cooperation and coordination. F36  
                                                          
34 See Joseph J. Norton, Global Financial Sector Reform:  The Single Financial 
Regulator Model Based on the United Kingdom FSA Experience – A Critical 
Reevaluation, 39 INT’L LAW. 15, 19 (2005) (“[E]ach country situation is sui 
generis, with the best, informed decision dependent on and taking regard of local 
historical, social, economic, financial market, regulatory and political factors and 
conditions.”). 
35 See Jones, supra note 5, at 125-26 (describing state securities regulators’ 
intervention when the SEC failed to heed whistleblowers’ complaints). 
36 See P.J. Crowley, Homeland Security and the Upcoming Transition:  What the 
Administration Should Do to Make Us Safe at Home, 2 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 
289, 300-01 (2008) (listing among the Department’s problems its lack of a clear set 
of priorities, weak management systems, no unifying culture or effective 
leadership, and poor employee morale); Stephen R. Heifetz, Op-Ed, The Risk of 
Too Much Oversight, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2008, at A19 (describing the tangled 
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The federal behemoth still operates out of many different buildings across 
the country and the turf-battles and information sharing problems that 
spurred its creation persist. 
 
IV.  BACK TO BASICS: 
RESTRUCTURING THE FINANCIAL INDUSTRY  
INSTEAD OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 
 
Proponents of regulatory consolidation premise their analysis by 
observing that the current regulatory structure is outdated in the post Glass-
Steagall era. 37  They emphasize the need to update regulation to reflect the 
realities of modern financial markets.  Unfortunately their proposals to 
restructure financial regulation do not grapple fully with all of the 
regulatory challenges created by Glass-Steagall’s repeal. 
 
A.  Unintended Consequences of Repealing Glass-Steagall 
 
When Gramm-Leach-Bliley became law, several commentators warned 
that the erosion of the traditional wall that divided commercial banking and 
investment banking could lead to a major financial crisis. 38  Chief among 
the problems the new law engendered was an unhealthy concentration of 
assets within a very few financial institutions. F39  A merger wave, already 
                                                                                                                                      
mess of homeland security laws that threaten the department’s effectiveness); Griff 
Witte & Spencer S. Hsu, Homeland Security Contracts Abused: Report Finds 
Extensive Waste, WASH. POST, July 27, 2006, at A1 (pointing to the insufficient 
resources needed to take on its post-consolidation responsibilities).  
37 See Blueprint, supra note 10, at 3-4; Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, 
Interim Rep. 59-70 (2006),  available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/research.html. 
38 See, e.g., J. Robert Brown, The “Great Fall:”  The Consequences of Repealing 
the Glass-Steagall Act, 2 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 129, 130 (1995) (predicting “the 
repeal of Glass-Steagall will provide, at best, marginal benefits while causing 
considerable damage to the securities markets”); Samuel Hayes III, The Impact of 
Recombining Commercial and Investment Banking, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 39, 44 
(2004) (describing how banks sacrificed their core lending business in pursuit of 
expanded investment banking opportunities); Matthew J. Restrepo, The 
Convergence of Commercial and Investment Banking Under the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act:  Revisiting Old Risks and Facing New Problems, 11 LAW. & BUS. REV. 
AM. 269, 273 (2005) (warning that the kinds of risky activities allowed by Gramm-
Leach-Bliley “could potentially jeopardize the safety and soundness of a bank and 
the stability of the banking system as a whole.”). 
39 Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking:  Financial 
Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. 
REV. 963, 975-78 (2009); See Kenneth D. Jones & Robert C. Oshinsky, The Effect 
of Industry Consolidation and Deposit Insurance Reform on the Resiliency of the 
U.S. Bank Insurance Fund, 5 J. FIN. STABILITY 57, 58 (2009).   
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underway, accelerated as the vestiges of regulatory separation collapsed. F40  
As Professor Wilmarth reports, more than “5,400 mergers took place in the 
U.S. banking industry from 1990 to 2005, involving more than $5.0 trillion 
in assets.” 41  Thus, the share of banking assets held by the ten largest banks 
more than doubled during that period, from twenty to fifty-five percent. F42   
Furthermore by 2006, the four largest securities firms (Merrill, Morgan, 
Goldman, and Lehman) had essentially become universal banks, offering an 
array of securities, banking, and lending services. 43  As legal barriers fell, 
most practical distinctions between commercial banks and investment 
banks faded as both types of institutions began to pursue similar business 
models. 44  Banking firms acquired securities subsidiaries, and securities 
firms attained deposit taking power to compete with banks in attracting 
FDIC-insured deposits that served as an attractive source of capital. 45    
Glass-Steagall’s repeal also allowed large banks to gamble with 
depositors’ funds, engaging in increasingly irresponsible risks in an effort 
to match the higher returns of their “investment banking” peers.  Their too 
big to fail status conferred an implicit government insurance guarantee, 
which allowed them to operate on lower capital and take on greater risks 
than smaller banks.  Capital markets were willing to tolerate their higher 
risk profiles because markets assumed (correctly) that in a worst-case 
scenario the government would not allow these big banks to fail. F46  Thus, 
large banks expanded further and further into high-risk activities and 
investments, including high-yield debt, syndicated lending, securitizations, 
sub-prime loans and over-the-counter derivatives. F47  These high risk 
gambits exemplify the moral hazard that accompanies too big to fail status. 
 In short, Glass-Steagall’s repeal and other deregulatory measures 
led to the reality that the financial health of the economy was dependent 
upon a very few institutions that were not only too big to fail, but also too 
big to regulate. F48  To restore stability to the financial markets, financial 
reform must address this daunting problem.   
 
 
                                                          
40 Wilmarth, supra note 7, at 251-54. 
41 Wilmarth, supra note 37, at 975. 
42 Id. at 975-76. 
43 Id. at 978. 
44 CARNELL, ET AL., supra note 2, at 28-29 (“No longer do clear cut separations 
exist between banking products and securities, between securities and insurance, or 
between banking and insurance.”). 
45 Wilmarth, supra note 7, at 424-25 (describing securities firms’ control over 
thrifts and other deposit taking institutions that were used to establish “sweep” 
accounts for brokerage customers). 
46 Id. at 300-02. 
47 Id. at 372. 
48 Id. at 250-52, 305-307.   
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B.  Benefits of Restoring the Glass-Steagall Wall 
 
With hindsight, we can see that the Glass-Steagall wall served two 
primary functions in preserving economic stability.  First, the wall 
simplified the tasks of financial regulators.  The Federal Reserve and other 
bank regulators were in charge of banks and other deposit collecting 
institutions.  State insurance regulators oversaw insurance firms, and the 
SEC and stock exchanges took charge of investor protection by regulating 
capital markets, broker-dealers, mutual funds and corporate financial 
disclosure practices. 
 A less apparent advantage of this arrangement was that it limited 
the adverse impact of regulatory failure by any single agency.  Problems 
stemming from regulatory failures could be contained effectively within 
one sector of the economy.  In addition, the Glass-Steagall wall provided a 
natural firebreak that limited the economic dangers of systemic risk.  The 
capital markets sector and the banking sector could backstop one another 
during periodic crises that occurred in either sector. F49  Banks could provide 
credit to corporations when the capital markets froze, and capital markets 
could finance corporations when the banking sector contracted. F50  This 
meant that the economic contagion from a bank collapse or credit freeze 
could be more readily contained. 
 Equally troubling is the reality that the anticipated benefits of 
industry consolidation promised by the repeal of Glass-Steagall failed to 
materialize. 51  Contrary to promises of improved profitability from 
synergies and economies of scale, bigger banks did not become more 
profitable. F52 In fact, many expected advantages turned out to be liabilities 
as universal banks were unable to meet consumers’ expectations due to 
their size and the impersonal nature of their enterprises. 53  The efforts of 
large financial institutions to expand their product lines through “one-stop 
shopping” failed because consumers preferred to purchase financial 
services from specialized firms rather than financial conglomerates. 54  
Financial institutions are more likely to recover quickly and sustainably if 
                                                          
49 Wilmarth, supra note 7, at 451-52. 
50 Id. at 235-236 (describing banks’ role as a provider of backup liquidity when 
capital markets for commercial paper froze). 
51 Id. at 223.  Professor Wilmarth states that proponents of “universal banking” 
promised that the new financial conglomerates would offer increased profitability 
due to economies of scale, increased safety and soundness through diversification, 
and lower costs and more convenience for consumers due to the benefits of “one-
stop shopping.” 
52 Id. at 272-77. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 432-33, 439. 
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they focus on their strengths and strive to provide the services that 
consumers and corporations need.  
 If we were to restructure the financial industry to reflect anew the 
traditional division between capital raising and commercial lending 
functions we would reduce the need to overhaul the entire regulatory 
system. 55  The task of regulatory reform would be simplified as we would 
only need to ensure that the bank regulatory system works well for banks, 
securities regulations adequately discipline securities dealers, and issuers 
and  insurance regulators are equipped to oversee the activities of insurance 
firms.    
 
C. Restructuring the Financial Industry 
 
Although breaking up the large financial firms sounds like a radical 
step, ample historical precedent exists for such government mandated 
action.  In the 1930s, banks successfully spun off their investment banking 
business, and financial institutions on both sides of the dividing line thrived 
for many decades.  In fact, the investment banks did so well they became 
the envy of their commercial banking peers, which led to the lobbying 
efforts that brought Glass-Steagall down. 
 Other historical precedents for industry restructuring include the 
break-up of utility holding companies mandated by the Public Utility Act of 
1935, F56 and AT&T’s restructuring as part of an antitrust settlement.  A 
wave of market-driven restructurings also occurred during the leveraged 
buyout boom of the 1980s.  More recently, the large U.S. accounting firms 
spun-off their consulting practices after Sarbanes-Oxley prohibited auditors 
from providing business consulting services to their audit clients.  Although 
these industry reforms were disruptive in many ways, they also brought 
benefits by increasing consumer choices, encouraging innovation, 
simplifying regulators’ tasks, and eliminating harmful conflicts of interest.  
Eventually investors, consumers, and the market adjusted to the new reality, 
and life went on. 
 Although some may argue that breaking up big banks will impose 
unreasonable costs on investors and could harm U.S. competitiveness, these 
concerns are belied by history.  The atomization of power commanded by 
the Glass-Steagall structure is one of the factors that helped the U.S. 
develop the deep and liquid securities markets that have become the envy of 
the world. F57  Furthermore, large financial institutions became weaker, not 
                                                          
55 Norton, supra note 33, at 18-19. 
56 Public Utility Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-333, 49 Stat. 803 (1935) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z-6 et seq. (repealed 2005). 
57 See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS 
OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE ( Princeton University Press 1994) 256-57; 
Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641, 
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stronger, in the wake of Gramm-Leach-Bliley. F58  It is difficult to imagine 
how restoring the status quo ante could do more harm to the economy than 
the cascade of disasters that Gramm-Leach-Bliley has wrought. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
Although the bank regulatory system and the securities regime 
must be dramatically improved, calls for massive regulatory consolidation 
are misplaced.  The most often cited rationale for such an overhaul points 
directly to the need for the approach suggested here.  Instead of 
consolidating the regulators, we should de-consolidate the financial 
industry.  A structural separation between investment banks and 
commercial banks can do more to protect the economy than close 
bureaucratic supervision of too big to fail firms could ever hope to achieve.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
645 (1996) (popular distrust of large aggregations of capital assured the 
development of weak financial intermediaries and stronger capital markets); 
Wilmarth, supra note 7, at 441 (competition between commercial banks and 
investment banks led to innovation and higher efficiencies for U.S. financial sector 
as compared to Europe). 
58 Wilmarth, supra note 7, at 411-13. 
